

REMARKS:

Claims 1-90 were pending in the application. Claims 1-2, 6, 11-16, 20-22, 25-32, 36, 41-46 and 50-90 have been amended. Claims 127-152 were added. Therefore, claims 1-90 and 127-152 are now pending in this application.

Section 102 Rejections

The Examiner rejected all of the pending independent claims under U.S.C. § 102 based on Bates et al., US Patent Number 6,785,732. Applicant submits that the present claims, as amended, are patentably distinct over the cited reference. (Applicant also submits that the prior version of the claims also distinguished over Bates, and that the claims were amended for clarification/broadening reasons only.)

Bates is about “**virus checking**.” *See* Bates (title). In fact, Bates appears to be limited to virus checking. *See id.* at col. 10, lines 56-58 (“If the checking of viruses in web pages is not enable (step 914=NO), the web page is sent to the client (step 916).”). Claim 1, on the other hand, recites “making a determination of the likelihood that a first resource received from a first computer network is misrepresented as being from a trusted source coupled to the first computer network.” Applicant submits that this is not what a virus checker does in general, and is not what Bates’ virus checker does.

Bates discloses “[a] web server apparatus and method in accordance with the preferred embodiments [that] automatically screens information requested by a web client for viruses according to defined user virus checking preferences, and takes appropriate action when a virus is found or when there is a threat of a URL containing a virus or a reference to a virus.” Bates at col. 4, lines 38-43. Bates’ “virus checker” is “a computer program that detects the presence of viruses that are defined in its virus definitions 126.” Bates at col. 5, lines 44-45. Thus, Bates operates on data such as web pages, e-mail messages, and downloaded files, see col. 3, line 65 to col. 4, line 36, to check for the presence of viruses.

Although Bates does not appear to supply a definition of “virus,” it appears that Bates is using the term to refer to malicious code that infects a computer upon a file containing the virus

being opened or executed. Claim 1 does not pertain to virus checking. Rather, claim 1 is concerned with whether a “first resource is misrepresented as being from a trusted source.” Applicant submits that a virus does not attack a user by “misrepresent[ing]” itself “as being from a trusted source.” Rather, a virus attacks a user’s computer simply by having the virus file opened or executed on the user’s computer. In the context of Bates, in fact, the “source” of a virus is not “misrepresented” at all; rather, the virus is known to originate from a particular web page, e-mail attachment, or downloaded data file. *See generally* col. 4.

In short, Applicant submits that claim 1 is fundamentally different than Bates’ virus checker. Applicant refers, as an example, to its specification at page 4, lines 18-28. (Note that this passage is exemplary and is not in any way intended to limit any of Applicant’s claims.) A brief perusal of this passage (or others in the present disclosure) shows that the disclosed embodiments are directed to a type of security attack that is distinct from a virus.

As such, Applicant submits that claim 1 and its dependent claims are patentably distinct over Bates. Bates simply does not teach each and every feature of claim 1, as is required to prove anticipation. Independent claims 31 and 61 recite similar features to claim 1 and are thus believed to be patentably distinct over Bates (along with their respective dependent claims), for reasons similar to those provided above in support of claim 1.

Independent Claim 129 and its dependent claims are believed to be patentably distinct over the cited art, as the cited art does not teach or suggest “program instructions that are executable on an information handling system to ... categorize data ... as to the likelihood of the received data spoofing its origin,” as recited claim 129.

Independent Claim 134 and its dependent claims are believed to be patentably distinct over the cited art, as the cited art does not teach or suggest “program instructions that are executable ... to ... analyze the received data to make a determination whether the received data indicates that it is from a first source coupled to the external network, but is actually from a second source coupled to the external network,” as recited claim 134.

Independent Claim 139 and its dependent claims are believed to be patentably distinct over the cited art, as the cited art does not teach or suggest “analyzing the received data to determine whether the origin of the received data is the first source,” as recited claim 139.

Independent Claim 144 and its dependent claims are believed to be patentably distinct over the cited art, as the cited art does not teach or suggest “program instructions that are executable on a first computing device to ... make a determination of the likelihood that the first web page is misrepresenting that it originates from the first website” as recited claim 144.

Independent Claim 149 and its dependent claims are believed to be patentably distinct over the cited art, as the cited art does not teach or suggest “program instructions that are executable on a first computing device to ... make a determination of the likelihood that the electronic message misrepresents that it originates from the first source,” as recited claim 149.

CONCLUSION:

Applicants submit the application is in condition for allowance, and an early notice to that effect is requested.

If any extension of time (under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136) is necessary to prevent the above-referenced application from becoming abandoned, Applicant hereby petitions for such extension.

The Commissioner is authorized to charge any fees that may be required, or credit any overpayment, to Meyertons, Hood, Kivlin, Kowert & Goetzel, P.C. Deposit Account No. 501505/6002-00701/DMM.

Respectfully submitted,

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